Any is not all: EPR and the Einstein-Tolman-Podolsky paper by Tresser, Charles
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
03
00
6v
2 
 1
4 
Ju
n 
20
05
Any is not all: EPR and the Einstein-Tolman-Podolsky paper
Charles Tresser∗
IBM, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, U.S.A.
(Dated: March 13, 2018)
In Bohm’s version of the EPR gedanken experiment, the spin of the second particle along any
vector is minus the spin of the other particle along the same vector. It seems that either the choice
of vector along which one projects the spin of the first particle influences at superluminal speed
the state of the second particle, or naive realism holds true (i.e., the projections of the spin of any
EPR particle along all the vectors are determined before any measurement occurs). Naive realism is
negated by Bell’s theory that originated and is still most often presented as related to non-locality,
a relation whose necessity has recently been proven to be false. I advocate here that the solution
of the apparent paradox lies in the fact that the spin of the second particle is determined along
any vector, but not along all vectors. Such an any-all distinction was already present in quantum
mechanics, for instance in the fact that the spin can be measured along any vector but not at
once along all vectors, as a result of the Uncertainty Principle. The time symmetry of the any-all
distinction defended here is in fact reminiscent of (and I claim, due to) the time symmetry of the
Uncertainty Principle described by Einstein, Tolman, and Podolsky in 1931, in a paper entitled
“Knowledge of Past and Future in Quantum Mechanics” that is enough to negate naive realism and
to hint at the any-all distinction. A simple classical model is next built, which captures aspects of
the any-all distinction: the goal is of course not to have a classical exact model, but to provide a
caricature that might help some people.
The stated goal of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (or
EPR) paper [1] was to prove the incompleteness of Quan-
tum Mechanics (or QM ). That paper used entangled
pairs of particles, i.e., two-particles states whose wave
functions cannot be written as tensor products. Follow-
ing now Einstein’s own views (see, e.g., [2], [3], as well as
[4] and references therein) rather than [1], what is mea-
sured on one particle, say among two pre-selected Con-
jugate Observables (or COs), influences what has to be
the wave function for the second particle (which can be
computed using Wave Packet Reduction), even if the two
measurements are space-like separated. Hence one has
to accept either the incomplete character of QM since
the wave function is assumed to be the most complete
description of a state, or physics to be non-local (i.e.,
to permit instant propagation of some effects of some
causes). The COs used in EPR were the position and
momentum. Instead of using the quite general configu-
ration of [1], we will consider entangled pairs of spin- 12
particles that are prepared, following Bohm [5], in the
so-called singlet state that is rotation invariant (see, e.g.,
[5], p. 400) and given along any vector by:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
1√
2
(|+〉1 ⊗ |−〉2 − |−〉1 ⊗ |+〉2) ,
as far as the description of the spin part of the wave func-
tion of the singlet is concerned. Then the COs are chosen
to be the projections of the spin on two orthogonal vec-
tors that are also orthogonal to the axis along which the
particles separate. The singlet state is invariant by rota-
tion, and the + and - signs that appear in the formula
for Ψ(x1, x2) correspond to the projections of the spins
of the two particles along the same arbitrary direction.
In particular, the singlet state is such that along any vec-
tor, the total projected spin is 0 (there is a corresponding
case for light polarization that is more practical for exper-
iments to date but that will not be used here [6]). If one
measures the normalized spin of a particle of the pair, say
particle 1, along some vector ~a, and the result s1(~a) is +1
or -1, then by Wave Packet Reduction (WPR), the new
state becomes respectively Ψ′(x1, x2) = |+〉1,~a ⊗ |−〉2,~a ,
or Ψ′(x1, x2) = |−〉1,~a ⊗ |+〉2,~a . The version of EPR us-
ing singlets is called EPRB and one also speaks of EPRB
pairs. Bell later proposed [7] to use arbitrary pairs of
vectors to project the spins of the two particles of EPRB
pairs. Notice that once the projection of the spin of par-
ticle 1 is measured along ~a so that s1(~a) = ε ∈ {+1, −1},
by using the WPR one gets the second particle in a known
spin state, as if it was prepared in that state: s2(~a) = −ε.
Knowing this spin projection of the second particle along
~a, QM tells us that the probability to find s2(~b) = s2(~a)
is P (θ) = 1+cos(θ)2 with θ the angle between ~a and
~b (this
is Malus’ law for polarization, but restated here for spin-
1
2 particles). Hence the probability P (θ) for the spin
of the second particle along ~b to be the same that the
spin of the first one along ~a (i.e., the probability to get
s2(~b) = s1(~a)) is P
′(θ) = 1 − P (θ) = 1−cos(θ)2 . The re-
lation between readings along ~a for the first particle and
along ~b for the second particle can also be formulated, as
Bell did in [7], in terms of the correlation between the
observations along these vectors, i.e., the average value
< · > of the product of s1(~a) by s2(~b): one then gets
< s1(~a) · s2(~b) >= −~a ·~b, as Bell noticed in [7] with no
further comment. More importantly, Bell also proved a
theorem (based on a inequality that relates several cor-
relations of spin projections along pairs of vectors) in [7],
under two main assumptions:
2- A1) There are predictive Hidden Variables (HVs)
(where predictive means that all variables, including the
observables, are determined once all variables are taken
into account, even if no one can know what the observ-
ables are determined to be), an hypothesis later some-
times replaced by assuming classical realism (according
to which, e.g., the projections of the spin of any EPR
particle along all directions are determined, even if out
of our reach, before measurement). The statistics of QM
augmented by HVs or by classical realism is anyway as-
sumed to be the same as for usual QM.
- A2) Locality to the effect that nothing travels faster
than light, so that the spin of one particle of an EPRB
pair does not depend on the setting of the measurement
tool used for the other one, at least when one assumes
that the measurements (or other evaluations of observ-
ables as they may occur under assumption A1) on the
particles are spatially separated.
I now present an over-simplified and thus false version
of the Bell reasoning, where instead of assuming HVs or
classical realism, one assumes that several measurements
can be made on any of the particles of an EPRB pair.
One can then measure the probability P (θ). Notice that
P ′(θ) can also be indirectly measured since the spin s~c(e)
of the electron e along ~c is minus the spin s~c(p) of the
positron p along the same vector ~c, when (e, p) is an
EPRB pair. As was recalled above, QM teaches us that:
(◦) P ′(θ) = 1− P ′(θ) = 1− cos(θ)
2
,
which has been confirmed by many experiments (see, e.g.,
[14] for a review).
Consider now 4 vectors ~a, ~a′, ~b, and ~b′, and set:
θ1 = (~a,~b), θ2 = (~b, ~a′), and θ3 = (~a′, ~b′).
Because the spin along a vector is a binary data, we
must have for instance:
(∗) P ′(θ1) + P ′(θ2) + P ′(θ3) ≥ P ′(θ1 + θ2 + θ3) .
Specializing (*) to θ1 = θ2 = θ3 =
π
4 so that θ1+θ2+θ3 =
3·π
4 , we see that P
′(θ1), P ′(θ2) and P ′(θ3) are all equal to
2−
√
2
4 (about .15), while P
′(θ1 + θ2 + θ3) =
2+
√
2
4 (about
.85), so that (∗) would reduce to the false inequality 1 >√
2. Under the same assumption, one also gets:
(∗∗) P ′(θ1) + P ′(θ2) + P (θ1 + θ2) ≥ 1 ,
which provides the same false inequality 1 >
√
2 when
specialized to θ1 = θ2 =
π
4 . Inequalities such as (∗) or
(∗∗) come from gedanken experiments where one mea-
sures several projections of the spins of the particles: 2
projections on each particle for (∗) and 2 on one side
and 1 on the other side for (∗∗): see [9] and references
therein. While this discussion, and the fact in particular
that (◦) has been experimentally verified, should have
bothered a ninetieth century physicist, the 1927 Uncer-
tainty Principle [8] implies in particular that while the
spin measurement for e or p in any given EPRB pair
could be made along any vector, such measurement can-
not be done along all vectors, and in fact not along more
than one vector at once on each side so that (∗) and even
(∗∗) need too many measurements.
Thus the Uncertainty Principle prevents the gedanken
experiments that lead to inequalities such as (∗) or (∗∗)
from becoming actual experiments by violation of a law of
physics (we say that we are dealing with counter-natural
experiments). Thus the impossible inequalities that one
gets are the consequence of the counter-natural character
of the gedanken experiments leading to inequalities such
as (∗) or (∗∗) in the setting that we have expounded
where many measurements are needed. Any projection
measurement is possible, but not all at once because of
the Uncertainty Principle, a principle so well accepted
that no one would look for further explanation of the
false inequalities that we have obtained.
The “any-all” distinction was not spelled out in the
previous papers that I know about, and although this
was not needed for what was attempted in [9] or [10], I
have come to realize the essential nature of the distinction
between the elements of the (any, all) pair, where :
- “any” means that the spin of an EPRB particle is de-
termined along “any one vector that one would choose”,
- “all” means that the spin of an EPRB particle is deter-
mined along “all vectors”.
Remark. There is a trivial physical impossibility in the
use of “all”, which is linked to the fact that, for instance,
“all vectors” contains infinitely many vectors: we will
thus understand “all vectors” as “as many vectors as one
wants”, so that in particular classical quantities can be
measured along “all vectors” (in this weakened sense) in
clear contrast with QM.
The price of overs-simplification was to hurt the rea-
soning by bumping head-on into the Uncertainty Princi-
ple. In the actual Bell setting, one can consider directly
P ′(θ) as well as P (θ), and one gives sense to P (θ) and/or
P ′(θ) for several values of the angle θ by augmenting
QM by predictive HVS or by classical realism (assump-
tion A1). Any inequality that one gets in the previous
oversimplified setting can as well be obtained in the ac-
tual Bell setting, and this holds true for instance for (∗)
or (∗∗), but with the new hypotheses, these inequalities
become instances of Bell Inequalities (BI).
Now, the 1931 paper by Einstein, Tolman, and Podol-
sky (hereafter ETP) [11], tells us that the Uncertainty
Principle works as well when going back in time. This
causes P (θ) or P ′(θ) to make sense for any θ but not for
all θ’s at once on any given EPRB pair, and the BIs such
as (∗) or (∗∗) are just as counter-natural in view of [11]
as they were under the former multiple measurements
hypotheses because of [8]. While the projection of the
3spin of an EPRB particle along any vector is determined
assuming realism, if said realism is to not contradict the
(backward) Uncertainty Principle, such projections can
only make sense for at most one vector per particle of
each EPRB pair and in particular not for all vectors.
Yet, because of the endemic any-all confusion, one is of-
ten erroneously faced with the alternative:
“non-locality of QM” vs “the spin of p is determined
before measurement along all vectors”.
The magic of Bell’s inequality, and of Bell’s Theorem
(according to which QM augmented by predictive HVs or
by classical realism leads to contradiction when assuming
locality) has made lots of people forget about the deep
counter-natural character of the setting. Whether or not
people mention he augmentation of QM, it is most often
locality which is charged with the impossible inequalities
that one reaches, and not counter-naturality. Noticeable
exception to collective blindness are the 1972 paper by de
la Pen˜a, Cetto, and Brody [12] (summarized on p. 312 of
[13]) and work by Fine from the early 1980’th [15], [16]
(see also [9] and [10] on such matters).
Here are some highlights of the understanding that one
can get now, in view of [11]:
- 1) Bell’s theorem allows one to disqualify naive real-
ism (and naive HVs theories, but it should be enough to
discuss naive realism since it is implied by naive HVs),
where “naive” stands for incompatible with QM and in
particular with the Uncertainty Principle and its corol-
laries.
- 2) The 1931 paper [11] by Einstein, Tolman, and
Podolsky allows one to disqualify the same type of naive
realism; in some sense [11] is precisely what makes such
realism “naive” (recall that the Uncertainty Principle was
only 4 years old in 1931 and that many distinguished
authors seem to not have appreciated the counter-natural
character of the setting needed to prove a Bell’s type
theorem till now!).
- 3) The ETP paper [11] might be a clue to under-
stand why Einstein avoided using counter-natural dis-
courses when dealing with the issue of the completeness
of QM. Whether that is the case remains a mystery to
me, especially in view of the fact that Podolsky (and
Rosen) fell in the trap (as so many did much later).
Anyway:
- 4) Because of the counter natural character of the
setting for Bell’s type theorems, such theorems cannot
be verified experimentally, nor can it be verified experi-
mentally that QM violates a Bell’s inequality.
- 5) One cannot establish a Bell type inequality which
makes sense if one uses an augmentation of QM that
involves a HV theory or a form of realism that permits
at most one measurement and/or one value among a set
of COs on any particle.
- 6) One cannot establish a Bell type inequality which
makes sense if one uses an augmentation of QM that
involves a HV theory or a form of realism that permits
at most one measurement and/or one value among a set
of conjugate observable on any particle, and possibly two
values if one can get information on one particle using
another particle that is entangled to the first one.
- 7) Bell’s theorem and [11] cannot disqualify non-naive
realism or HVs, but I do not know of any good reason
to expect an augmentation of QM by non-naive HVs or
realism to work, nor to expect the contrary (I personally
consider that the hopes for a completion of QM are a last
form of anthropocentrism since very small scale escape
space-time geometry; see [10] on that matter).
I have provided in [9] a setting for a Bell’s type theorem
(leading to (∗∗)) that is simple enough to allow to better
see the fact that it is the counter-natural character that
is a problem, so that Okam’s razor should cut out non-
locality (see also[10]). Recall that non-locality cannot
be disposed of otherwise than by using Okam’s razor or
something of that kind because it is not susceptible of
experimental evidence nor of counter evidence.
Bell’s Theorems allow one to show the incompatibil-
ity with QM of the type of realism that one can extract
from the original EPR paper [1] written by Podolsky.
This is the same naive form of realism that one can see
also in a text written 50 years later by Rosen in [17] (in
both cases, the naive realism is hidden in a subtle way)
but it is quite different (see [10] and references therein)
from the form of realism used by Einstein. Expositions
of the non-completeness of QM by Einstein himself avoid
counterfactuals: see, e.g., the 1936 text reproduced in [2]
and the later piece in [3] where Einstein also stays away
from naive realism. In effect, Bell type theorems, and
further entanglements analysis such as for the so-called
GHZ states, have been used a lot to disqualify realism
[18], [19], [20], [10]. However it is often by restricting
the analysis to naive realism (without pointing out its
naive character), hence restricting to realism of a sort
that Einstein by himself has always avoided (at least as
soon as the 1930’s) but still attributing such realism to
Einstein, making the attacks worthwhile (a brutal -even
if not desired- form of Einstein bashing, as follows from
the rest of this paper in view of [13] and [4]).
I next proceed to construct a model that may help one
picture what is going on in the any-all business (nothing
more than a naive image is to be expected from classical
models, as far as I understand; some may not want any
such false images because they are of no help given the
profound difference between the classical and the quan-
tum world. Anyway, only vague hints can be expected
from the classical models that I propose here for the any-
all discussion.
To this modest end, I begin with a model with even
more modest goals. We consider the z-axis, or vertical
line ∆z (thus defined by x = y = 0) in R
3, and the
vertical tube T with section the square sup(|x|, |y|) = 1.1.
4Each face of the tube is equipped with (separation) lines
with constant z that are equally spaced, at distance 1 of
each other and we assume that the space in between two
lines is colored, alternatively in black (or marked “1”)
and white (or marked “-1”). Now the line closest to the
plane z = 0 is different on each face, with a shift from
z = 0 given by:
- z = Z1 = 0 for the first face of T , x = 1.1,
- z = Z2 =
1
4 for the second face of T , y = 1.1,
- z = Z3 =
1
2 for the third face of T , x = −1.1,
- z = Z4 =
3
4 for the fourth face of T , y = −1.1.
Imagine now a ball Bα of diameter 1 centered on the
point z = α of ∆z, where α is any real number that is not
of the form Zi + n with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and n ∈ Z. Imag-
ine that the ball Bα, when pushed quasi-horizontally to
the kth face Fk of T , has to fall with its center hori-
zontally aligned with the center C(k, α) of the unique
colored square of Fk that contains the horizontal line
z = α. After being so pushed, the k-value of Bα is 1 or
−1 depending on the color of the square of Fk with cen-
ter C(k, α). Before being so “measured” against a face
of T , any of the k-values of the ball Bα is determined,
but while not all of them can be measured at once, all
of them are indeed determined. Let us try to improve
a bit the status, keeping in mind that the classical and
quantum Worlds are definitely different.
In a modification of the above setting, the ball B′β is
oval of vertical length equal to 2, and by pushing to a
face, one gets to the C(k, β) determined, not by the ge-
ometric center of B′β, but by its field dependent center
of gravity G(Fk, B
′
β) as it gets revealed by the field Fk
in place near the face Fk of T . The way the dust that
fils B′β gets concentrated to G(Fk, B
′
β) under the influ-
ence of the field Fk is deterministic but quite complex,
sensitive upon initial conditions, and irreversible. The
determination is made by experimentation (pushing to
a face): one cannot use a (discrete) machine computa-
tion as any knowledge must be gained in finite time and
there is sensitivity upon initial conditions. The rare cases
leeading to ambiguity are eliminated. Thus, before be-
ing “measured” against a face of T , any of the k-values
of the ball B′β is determined as the measured value if
the k value gets to be measured, but it is not true that
all of the k-values are determined: the impossibility of
joined valuation is exactly as strong as the impossibility
of simultaneous measurement. In fact, the only access to
determination is measurement, although all that deter-
mines the position of G(Fk, B
′
β) in B
′
β is there so that
there is no room for indeterminacy, but only an effective
impossibility for the determination: the goal was not to
have a classical exact model, but a model allowing to ac-
cept what may elude our full understanding forever (as
advocated in [10]).
The reader will easily check that the tube structure can
be made richer, so that all of the shifts happen instead
of just four of them: then one finds also a correlation
similar to Malus’ law (correlation = ~a · ~b) between the
values of successive measures along ~a and then ~b.
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